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Ph.D. in Business Administration (Field: Economics), Stanford Graduate School of Business
B.S. in Mathematics/Economics, University of California at Los Angeles, magna cum laude
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Elasticity of demand is a hot topic in the legal world. It is cited in a variety of cases when it comes to damages, and specifically in antitrust cases when it comes to market definition and market power.
In the field of economics, elasticity is a term that refers to the change in one economic variable that results from a change in some other economic variable. The term price elasticity of demand is used to describe the responsiveness of consumer demand to a change in price.
The formula for the price elasticity of demand is often described as having three components: (1) the quantity demanded of the product, (2) price of the product, (3) the ratio of the change in demand to the change in price.
Price elasticity can be divided into two broad types. This is related to whether the price at issue is the productās own price or the price of another product:
The elasticity of demand is evaluated to: (1) define the relevant antitrust market, (2) analyze market power, and (3) calculate any change in quantity needed as part of a damage calculation.
A relevant market is defined as a set of products or services that consumers consider to be reasonably close alternatives. This can be evaluated by looking at substitution patterns in response to price changes. As described above, one measure of responsiveness to price changes is the elasticity of demand.
If the price of a consumerās most-preferred product goes up they may choose to shift to other products. Economists often use historical price changes as an opportunity to observe these shifts and identify which products consumers view as the closest alternatives. Various tests based on this principle exist, such as the Hypothetical Monopolist Test (āHMTā) and the Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price (āSSNIPā) test.
One way in which firms use market power is to raise prices above the competitive level. A plaintiff typically must show that a defendant has or could obtain market power to prevail in an antitrust case.
Market power is frequently evaluated by determining if the elasticity of demand for the consumer is high or low. If the elasticity of demand is high, this indicates there are close substitutes that customers would readily switch to if prices were to increase. Alternatively, if the elasticity of demand is low then there are few close substitutes. Therefore, evidence showing a low elasticity of demand can be indicative of market power.
One form of economic damage is price erosion. Price erosion damage occurs if one firm takes an illegal action that forces another firm to lower its prices. The firm whose prices were lowered due to this conduct might sue for damages on the basis that lower prices resulted in lower profits.
However, lower prices may also lead to a greater quantity of sales. This can be evaluated using the elasticity of demand, which measures responsiveness of quantity to price.
Elasticity of demand can be relevant for market definition, market power, and damages. Courts have used evidence on elasticity of demand in situations such as the following cases:
Elasticity can be evaluated using a variety of evidence:
Having addressed the what, why, when, and how of elasticity, we now turn to five examples of it being referenced in federal courts.
The elasticity of demand has been cited in hundreds of court cases, including by U.S. District Courts, Circuit Courts, and the Supreme Court.
Brown Shoe is an antitrust merger case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1962. This was a case about the planned merger between two shoe companies. The question arose as to how to define the market for shoes, specifically whether there was a āprice/qualityā and āage/sexā distinction within the larger categories of menās, womenās, and childrenās shoes.[1]
In the U.S. Supreme Court ruling, āThe outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.ā[2] While this case acknowledged the potential importance of elasticity of the demand, it also relied on āpractical indiciaā of market definition.[3]
Queen City Pizza is an antitrust case decided by the 3rd Circuit in 1997. The case involved a dispute over pizza franchiseesā contractual commitment to purchase supplies from Dominos.[4]
In the 3rd Circuitās decision, āWhere the plaintiff fails to define its proposed relevant market with reference to the rule of reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demandā¦the relevant market is legally insufficient and a motion to dismiss may be granted.ā[5]Ā From an economics standpoint, care should be taken when interpreting this because own-elasticity of demand can be informative about cross-elasticity of demand.
Crystal Semiconductor is a case decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit (āCAFCā) in 2001. This was a patent infringement case including a claim of lost profit on a theory of price erosion.[6]Ā Plaintiffs claimed that they would have been able to increase their profits by raising prices but for the infringement.
The CAFC ruled that Plaintiffs āpresented no evidence of the elasticity of demand,ā nor did they āmake any estimates as to the number of sales it would have lost or kept had it increased its pricesā¦. Thus, Crystal did not make a showing of ābut forā causation of price erosion.ā[7] The Plaintiffs argument was found to be flawed because they failed to account for a potential reduction in quantity that might have corresponded to the price increase they allegedly would have made.
FTC v. AbbVie is a case decided by the 3rd Circuit in 2020. It was alleged that certain Defendants entered into anticompetitive reverse-payment agreements to monopolize and restrain trade over the testosterone-replacement drug AndroGel.[8] A key issue in the case was whether AndroGel, a gel, belonged in the same relevant antitrust market as other testosterone replacement therapies that were injections.[9]
The 3rd Circuit described evidence that the District Court relied on to find ālittle cross-elasticity of demandā between injectables and AndroGel:
Based on this evidence, the āDistrict Court defined the product market as āthe market for all TTRTs [Topical/transdermal Testosterone Replacement Therapies]āā which did not include injectables in the relevant antitrust market.[11]Ā The 3rd Circuit upheld the lower courtās market definition and the conclusion that Defendants āAbbVie and Besins had monopoly power in the relevant market.ā[12]
ICTSI Oregon v. International Longshore and Warehouse Union is a case decided by a District Court for Oregon in 2020. The case arose out of a dispute at a container terminal in the Port of Portland. The International Longshore and Warehouse Union (āILWUā) was found to have āengaged in work stoppages, slowdowns, āsafety gimmicks,ā and other coercive actionsā to get Plaintiff ICTSI to pressure the port to switch work from the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (āIBEWā) to the ILWU.[13]Ā
Defendants āraised serious reliability questions about [Plaintiffās damages] model because it included increases of both pricing and volume.ā[14] The Court pointed to evidence that āthese ports compete in a market with a relatively elastic demand curveā to support its finding that āthe jury awarded excessive lost profit damages, and a new trial on damages is warranted.ā[15]
Elasticity of demand is an economic measurement which frequently appears in litigation at all levels. Courts have found evidence regarding the elasticity of demand to be informative when evaluating market definition, market power, and damages. Economic experts are essential for unravelling the complex issues which can arise when applying this measurement to cases.
From the examples above,
These provide examples of the wide variety of cases in which the elasticity of demand can be used. This complex topic can decisively change the outcome of liability or damage phases of a case. Given the importance of this topic, it would be most beneficial to work with an expert who has intricate knowledge and experience of elasticity of demand.
[1] Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962) (āwe conclude that the record supports the District Court’s finding that the relevant lines of commerce are men’s, women’s, and children’s shoes. ā¦Appellant, however, contends that the District Court’s definitions fail to recognize sufficiently “price/quality” and “age/sex” distinctions in shoes.ā).
[2] Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (footnote omitted).
[3] Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (footnote omitted).
[4] Queen City Pizza v. Dominoās Pizza, 124 F.3d 430, 433-434 (3rd Circ. 1997).
[5] Queen City Pizza v. Dominoās Pizza, 124 F.3d 430, 436 (3rd Cir. 1997).
[6] Crystal Semiconductor v. Tritech Microelectronics, 246 F.3d 1336, 1342, 1357 (C.A.F.C. 2001).
[7] Crystal Semiconductor v. Tritech Microelectronics, 246 F.3d 1336 at 1359 (CAFC) (citation omitted).
[8] FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 976F.3d 327, 338 (3rd Cir. 2020).
[9] FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 976F.3d 327, 373 (3rd Cir. 2020) (āAbbVie and Besins claim the District Court clearly erred by excluding injectables from the product marketā).
[10] FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327, 372 (3rd Cir. 2020).
[11] FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327, 372 (3rd Cir. 2020).
[12] FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327, 371 (3rd Cir. 2020).
[13] ICTSI Oregon v. International Longshore Workers Union, 422 F.Supp.3d 1329, 1337-1338 (D.C.OR 2020).
[14] ICTSI Oregon v. International Longshore Workers Union, 422 F.Supp.3d 1329, 1362 (D.C.OR 2020).
[15] ICTSI Oregon v. International Longshore Workers Union, 422 F.Supp.3d 1329, 1363 (D.C.OR 2020).